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ENDOGENOUS MACROECONOMIC GROWTH THEORY
ABSTRACT
The paperfocuses on the innovation-based approach to
endogenous growth. It begins by spelling out conditions for
sustained long-run growth in neoclassical economies and uses
these conditions as a standard of comparison for the conditions
required to sustain long-run growth in economies with product
innovation. It presents two models of product innovation that
can sustain growth in the long run. The models share the same
fundamental mechanism of economic growth. They are used to
derive a variety of implications relating structural features to
long-run growth rates and they are then applied to a number of
policy issues. The usefulness of the approach represented by
these models is examined by considering a number of issues, such
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References 421. INTRODUCTION
Fortunes of nations change over time. Leading economic powers of the past have
become poorly performing economies of the present, and poor economies of the past have
become the new leaders. The determinants of the wealth of nations and its evolution
over time have mystified economists ever since the beginnings of our discipline. Why do
some countries grow faster than others? And how have the underlying forces of growth
changed over time? Complete answers to these questions cannot possibly be provided
within the narrow limits of a single branch of economics, such as macroeconomics, nor
even within the confines of our profession as commonly perceived.Nevertheless,
macroeconomic theories of economic growth have much to offer, as exemplified by the
seminal contributions of Ramsey (1928), Harrod (1939), Domar (1946) and Solow
(1956).
The neoclassical theory of economic growth has been mostly concerned with
capital accumulation. When confronted with data, however, its central tenet could
explain only a fraction of the variations in growth rates, while the rest was attributed to
technical progress (see Solow [1957] and Maddison [1987]). On the other hand, attempts
to explain technical progress were, unfortunately, not very successful, with Arrow's
(1962a) theory of learning—by—doing being an exception. But that theory suffers from
the limitation that it assumes that productivity improvements occur serendipitously as a
byproduct of capital accumulation, while deliberate efforts to develop new products and
technologies have been very prominent indeed.It suffices to recall the dramatic
developments in consumer electronics, computers and pharmaceuticals in order to see
the important role of deliberate research and development in raising our standards of
living. R&D has grown in importance in all industrial nations. In the OECD countries—2—-
in particular real expenditure on R&D has grown at 6% per annum in the decade ending
in 1985 (see OECD [1989j). And some of the large Japanese companies now invest more
in research and development than in plant and equipment. We have to bear these facts
in mind when constructing our theories.
The new wave of research on economic growth was stimulated by Romer (1986)
and Lucas (1988). Their work relies on Arrow's mechanism of learning—by—doing. But
following Uzawa (1965), they have redirected its application to the accumulation of
knowledge and human capital rather than the accumulation of plant and equipment.
And at least as important, they have changed the focus towards explanations of
sustained long—run growth and cross country variations in growth rates.
Following Arrow (1962a) they have taken the view that aggregate production
exhibits increasing returns to scale. But the returns to scale are external to single
economic agents and internal to a sector or larger parts of the economy. Consequently
competition can prevail. This approach avoids complications of market conduct and
structure that arise when economies of scale are internal to firms. Such complications
are unavoidable, however, when we wish to deal explicitly with profit seeking
investment in innovation, as we should, given the rising importance of commercial R&D
in the industrial world.
The integration of imperfect competition with innovation—based growth was first
achieved by Judd (1985). His main interest was in issues of industrial organization,
however. For this reason he did not explore the implications of his work for growth.
Romer (1990a) combined Judd's approach with learning—by—doing in innovation and
thereby developed a model that Sustains long—run growth at an endogenou3 rate. This
was an important achievement, because it opened the door to a new research line with
attractive realistic features.—3—
Learning—by—doingin research and development is a natural phenomenon.1
Current researchers use the stock of knowledge that has been accumulated over long
periods of time. They draw upon the laws of physics and mathematics, properties of
chemical compounds, the structure of a cell, and other fruits of past labor. And they
make use of accumulated knowledge about commercial traits, such as methods of
refrigeration or the architecture of personal computers. Many commercial R&D efforts
generate not only an appropriable product such as a technology for the manufacturing of
a new good, but also a nonappropriable product such as a new way of using components,
or a new material that can be used in a variety of applications. The nonappropriable
product adds to society's general stock of knowledge, which is freely used by many
parties. These spillovers from industrial research drive a wedge between the private and
social return on R&D (see Arrow [1962b]). Existing estimates indicate that the social
rate of return on R&D is more than twice as high as the private rate of return (see
Mansfield et aJ. [1977] and Scherer [19821). It follows that the uncoinpensated product
of R&D is substantial. Naturally, the incentive of entrepreneurs to innovate derives
from the return on the compensated product. These features will be taken into account
in what follows.
New innovation—based models of economic growth come closer than ever before
to Schumpeter's view of the capitalist system:
"Was not the observed performance [of technological progress] due to that stream
of inventions that revolutionized the technique of production rather than to the
businessman's hunt for profits? The answer is in the negative. The carrying into
effect of those technological novelties was of the essence of that hunt." (p.110)
His emphasis on the entrepreneur and the link between innovation and profits are
'Empirical studies of productivity have used knowledge capital variables that are based
on cumulative R&D expenditure long before their use in the theoretical models; see
Griliches (1979).—4—
clearly manifested in this literature, as is his belief that the marginal productivity of
innovations need not decline, because new inventions can be as productive as old.
2. NEOCLASSICAL GROWTH
We are all familiar with the neodassical theory of economic growth; it has been
taught almost unrivaled for about three decades. For this reason there is no need for me
to dwell upon it in detail. Nevertheless, my discussion of endogenous growth would be
grossly incomplete if I neglected to point out its place in the neoclassical theory. I will
therefore lay out conditions needed for sustained endogenous growth in neoclassical
models, and relate them to similar conditions in innovation—based models of growth.
The main point I wish to make in this regard appears already in Solow's (1956)
classic paper and can be seen most clearly with the help of his model. Consider a
stripped down version of a Solow economy in which the labor force does not grow,
capital does not depreciate, and the state of technology does not change over time.
Under these conditions accumulation of capital equals saving:
(2.1) l =sF(K,L),
where K represents the capital stock, L the labor force, s the savings rate, and F(.)
the constant returns to scale production function.Evidently, in this economy the
capital stock grows without bound. It follows that output also grows without bound and
so does income per capita. But what happens to the growth rate of per capita income?—5—
The rate of growth of income per capita equals
(2.2) =sF(K,L),
where FK(•) denotes the marginal product of capital. Therefore the long—run growth
rate approaches zero unless the marginal product of capital remains positive as capital
accumulates without bound. The assumption that the marginal product of capital
approaches zero (an Inada condition) has been common in the literature. When this
condition holds growth peters out. Observe, however, that this simple Solow economy
sustains long—run growth whenever the marginal product of capital is bounded below by
.a positive constant.
The condition for sustained growth becomes more demanding in the presence of
capital depreciation or population growth. If, for example, the population grows at tLe
rate > 0, the lower bound on the marginal product of capital that is needed to
sustain long—run growth becomes F(K,L)> go/s(rather than FK(K,L) > 0).
Evidently, this lower bound is higher the higher the rate of population growth and the
lower the rate of savings. The main point remains the same, however: the economy
grows in the long run if the marginal product of capital does not decline too much as a
result of capital accumulation.2
Our last conclusion depends only partially on the postulated form of saving
behavior. As an alternative to the fixed saving rate take, for example, the case of
infinitely lived consumers who optimize over their choice of consumption and saving,
using a time separable intertemporal utility function with a constant elasticity of the
2This insight has been exploited in a number of recent studies, such as Rebelo (1990) and
Jones and Manuelli (1990a).— 6—
marginalutility of consumption. The intertemporal utility function is given by
(2.3) U =fe_T_t)u(r)dr,
whereu(r)describesthe flow of utility at time randp represents the subjective rate




where C,, stands for the consumption level of the final product Y. The parameter ti
representsthe elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption while its inverse I/v
equals the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. A consumer that maximizes
(2.3)—(2.4) subject to an intertemporal budget constraint allocates consumption
according to the rule:
(2.5)
where r stands for the nominal interest rate and for the nominal price of output.
It follows that consumption grows over time at a rate given by the product of the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution and the difference between the real interest rate
and the subjective discount rate.
Equation (2.5) shows clearly that this type of an economy sustains long—run
growth only if the real interest rate remains above the subjective discount rate in the—7—
long run. As is well known) however, in the absence of capital depreciation the real
interest rate equals the marginal product of capital. It follows that income per capita
grows in the long run if and only if the marginal product of capital remains higher than
the subjective rate of time preference. In this case the long—run rate of growth is higher
the lower is the subjective rate of time preference and the higher the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution.
We have thus seen that a sufficiently high marginal product of capital leads to
long—run growth in per capita income for two forms of saving. It may appear therefore
that savings behavior does not constrain growth in neoclassical economies.This
conclusion is unwarranted, however. First, even in the above discussed cases parameters
of the saving function do matter whenever growth does not peter out. And second, there
exist economic structures in which aggregate saving is insufficient to sustain long—run
capital accumulation even with high marginal products of capital. Jones and Manuelli
(1990b) and Boldrin (1990) provide examples of this phenomenon. They show that in a
one—sector overlapping generations model growth peters out in the long run because the
young generation does not have enough resources to purchase an ever increasing capital
stock. For this reason aggregate saving, that amount to the savings of the young,
cannot support continued growth.
Leaving aside the case of overlapping generations, recall the role that technical
progress can play in the neoclassical theory. With labor augmenting technical progress
the production function takes the form
(2,6) Y =F(K,AL),
where A represents the state of technology. Technical progress raises A and thereby—8—-
the marginal product of capital. Higher marginal productivity of capital leads to a
higher real interest rate. Now take the case in which the rate of consumption growth is
governed by (2.5). In this case capital accumulation depresses the real interest rate and
therefore the rate of consumption growth, while technical progress raises the real
interest rate thereby increasing the rate of consumption growth. In steady state the rate
of capital accumulation equals the rate of technical progress and the real interest rate
remains constant. This describes the case of exogenous technical progress that leads to
exogenous long—run growth.
Following Arrow's analysis of learning—by—doing, however, some growth
theorists have linked the state of technology to cumulative investment experience. With
this view the state of technology parameter A becomes a function of the economy's
capital stock A(K) (see Sheshinski [1967]). The effect of capital on productivity is
assumed to be external to an individual investor. For this reason the real interest rate
equals the private marginal product of capital FK[K,A(K)L]. It follows that with this
form of endogenous technical progress an economy can sustain long—run growth as long
as the state of technology is sufficiently responsive to capital accumulation.
This discussion points to the fact that sustainability of long—run growth depends
critically on the extent to which capital accumulation depresses its marginal
productivity as perceived by investors, and on whether there exist offsetting forces that
prevent the marginal product of capital from declining too much. In the model of
learning—by—doing, learning provides an offsetting device, but this mechanism will not
suffice if the pace of learning is not fast enough or learning is bounded.
Now that we have identified the mechanisms of long—run growth in the
neoclassical theory, we may turn to the more recent innovation—based theories of—9---
economic growth. I begin with an approach based on horizontal product differentiation.
This approach suffers from several shortcomings, some related to the specification of
product differentiation and others related to the mechanism of knowledge accumulation.
it is important, however, to bear in mind as I proceed that these details are not
particularly important, as they can and will be replaced with more appealing ingredients
without affecting the results in any fundamental way. On the other hand, the approach
I will describe first has the advantage of being simple, and it brings out in a clear way
important characteristics of the innovation—based approach to economic growth.
3. EXPANDING PRODUCT VARIETY
A particularly simple model of innovation—based growth builds on the Dixit and
Stiglitz (1977) formulation of horizontal product differentiation. We define an index D
by means of the following constant elasticity of substitution function:
n
(3.1) D =
X(J)adJ],0< a < 1,
0
where x(j) represents the quantity of variety jofa high—tech product, n stands for
the measure (the number) of available brands, and a is a parameter. The elasticity of
substitution between every pair of brands equals 1/(1—a). The postulated restriction
on a implies an elasticity of substitution larger than one, which means that varieties
substitute well for each other.Equation (3.1) yields constant elasticity demand
functions with marginal revenue MR(j) =ap(j),where p(j) represents the price of— 10—
brandj (thedemand elasticity with respect to the price equals the elasticity of
substitution).
Next assume that all brands require the input of one unit of labor per unit
output. Then marginal costs equal the wage rate w for all brands, and MR(j) =
MC(j)implies that all brands are equally priced at
(3.2)p=.
With this pricing rule operating profits are
(3.3)
perbrand, where X represents aggregate output of high—tech products.
These relationships are well known from the static theory of monopolistic
competition. In a static environment one would add fixed costs of, say, I units of labor
per brand in manufacturing, and close this model with Chamberlain's free entry
condition for the large group case that requires zero (excess) profits; i.e.,=wf,and a
labor market clearing condition, X + nf =L,where L represents available labor.3
This simple general—equilibrium model of horizontal product differentiation has
been extended by Judd (1985) to a dynamic framework. His formulation, like most of
the new literature on innovation—based growth, interprets the fixed costs as a research
and development expense, where R&D leads to the development of new varieties of the
differentiated product.Other specifications assign R&D the role of product
3From these two conditions together with (3.2) and (3.3) we calculate the equilibrium
number of brands n =(1.—a)L/fand the output level X =L.—11—
improvement (vertical product differentiation) or cost reduction (see Aghion and Howitt
(19901 and Grossman and Helpman [1991a]). A central feature of R&D costs is that they
have to be paid up front, before operating profits can be appropriated. Consequently
operating profits accrue at different points in time from R&D costs. This realistic time
structure introduces natural dynamics.
In the dynamic version of monopolistic competition we replace Chamberlain's
static free entry condition with a dynamic free entry condition that takes the following
form (this discussion follows Grossman and Helpman [1991b, chap. 31). Firms are
valued according to their expected profit stream. A typical firm owns the technology for
manufacturing a single brand of the differentiated product and it possesses indefinite
monopoly power in the supply of its brand. It follows that the value of a firm equals the
present value of its profits,
(3.4) v(t)=
wherev represents the value of a firm and R(r,t) =fr(z)dzrepresents the discount
rate from time r to t. This implies the no arbitrage condition
(3.5)
Itstates that the rate of return on the ownership of a firm —consistingof the profit
rate /v (the inverse of the price—earning ratio) and the rate of capital gain v/v —
hasto equal the nominal interest rate r.— 12—
Anentrepreneur that contemplates investing resources in the development of a
new brand expects a reward of v on his R&D effort. He therefore engages in product
development unless the cost of R&D exceeds this value. Now suppose that the
productivity of research labs rises with the stock of available knowledge K. This
property plays a central role in bringing about endogenous long—run growth, as we will
shortly see. In this case the dynamic free entry condition implies that at each point in
time the value of a firm does not exceed product development costs wa/Ku, where
represents a parameter (because otherwise labs will have an unbounded demand for
labor), and the flow of newly invented products equals zero, unless product development
costs just equal the value of a firm:
(3.6) v !, with equality whenever ñ >0.
Nowlabor market clearing requires employment in R&D plus employment in
manufacturing to equal the available labor supply:
(3.7) + X =
wherethe first term on the left hand side represents employment in R&D and the
second term represents employment in manufacturing.
In this economy investment consists of developing new products (as opposed to
building new capital equipment in the neoclassical growth model). This investment has
to be financed by savings. For this purpose we may borrow the intertemporal structure






As before, the parameter v represents the elasticity of the marginal utility of
consumption, while CD represents consumption in terms of the indexD.In
equilibrium CD =D.It follows from our discussion in the previous section that in this
case too infinitely lived households allocate spending over time according to (see (2.5])
C P
-= r—p—-,
whereis the price index of D, given by
(3.10) D =
Thiscompletes the description of the growth model, except for the evolution of
knowledge capital.
4. IMPLICATIONS
As we will see shortly, long—run properties of economies of the type I have
described depend in important ways on the evolution of knowledge capital. For this
reason I deal first with the case in which knowledge capital is constant and only later on
with the more interesting case of a positive feedback from R&D experience to the14 —
knowledgestock.
ConstantKnowledgeCapital
In the case of a constant stock of knowledge capital the economy does not grow
in the long run. This result is important for understanding the forces of long—run
growth that I will describe later. It is necessary, however, first to spell out what we
mean by growth in the present context. What growth rate should we measure? Real
gross domestic product is a natural candidate. So is the real consumption index CD
(=D).For current purposes I use the latter (see, however, Grossman and Helpman
[1991b, chap. 3] for the relationship between these two growth rates).
The first thing to observe is that the real consumption index can grow in the long
run if either variety expands over time or aggregate output of manufacturing rises over
time. For a constant stock of knowledge capital, however, the resource constraint (3.7)
implies that the flow of new goods and the output volume are both bounded. Therefore
the rate of innovation g, defined as the rate of increase of the number of products (i.e.,
g =n/n),converges to zero, and the rate of growth of the real consumption index also
converges to zero.4
Rising Knowledge Capital
The assumption of a constant stock of knowledge capital is not realistic. An
economy that engages in product innovation expands its knowledge base. It is, however,
necessary to distinguish between different forms of knowledge. For even in the above
4Since all brands are equally priced they are used in the same quantities. In the event
(3.1) implies D =n'Xand the rate of growth of D equals 12g +— 15—
described economy with a constant stock of knowledge capital innovation leads to an
expansion of knowledge, in the sense that it increases the number of brands that the
economy knows how to produce. Knowledge, as measured by the number of blue prints,
rises over time in an innovating economy, and this knowledge expansion raises the
productivity of resources in manufacturing. There exists, however, another measure of
knowledge that we have termed knowledge capital. This stock of knowledge affects
productivity in the research lab. Cumulative experience in R&D raises the productivity
of labs by raising the stock of knowledge capital available to researches, as I have
explained in the introduction. Unlike some forms of learning by doing, however, such as
on the job training, important parts of knowledge that accumulates in the process of
research and development can be used by other agents.
In order to capture these features I now follow Romer (1990a) in assuming that
the stock of knowledge capital equals cumulative experience in R&D as measured by the
number of brands that have been developed; namely
(4.1) K =n.
This specification implies that every developer of a new brand contributes equally to the
future stock of knowledge, but more flexible forms can be used without altering the main
thrust of the argument (see Grossman and Helpman [1991b, chap. 3]) In our case the
economy settles down immediately on a steady state that can be characterized by the
following two equations:5
The first equation is a direct consequence of the resource constraint (3.7). The second
results from the no—arbitrage condition (3.5) in the following way. Take the wage rate
to be the numeraire; i.e., w(t) =1for allt. Then from the pricing equation (3.2)
p =1/ce, aconstant, and output per brand equals for all brands (although it may vary— I()—
(4.2) ag+X=L,
(43) (l_)X=pjg 13D=[i+izi._i)J.
The first equation represents the resource constraint, where g is the rate of innovation,
while the second describes the no—arbitrage condition. The left hand side of (4.3)
represents the inverse of the price earning ratio while the right hand side represents the
effective cost of capital; namely, the real interest rate minus the rate of capital gain on
equity holdings. I assume>0.
Our steady state conditions are depicted in figure 3.1; line LL represents the
resource constraint while NN represents the no—arbitrage condition. The latter may be
termed the Schumpeter line, because it embodies the notion that innovation is driven by
the quest for profit opportunities. LL slopes downwards because an increase in the rate
of innovation involves more employment in research labs and therefore less employment
in manufacturing. On the other hand NN slopes upwards. An increase in the rate of
innovation raises the effective cost of capital to an entrepreneur, because it leads to a
higher real interest rate and a faster depreciation of the value of a firm. Consequently
the entrepreneur requires a higher profit rate (a lower price earning ratio) in order to
over time). It follows from (3.1) that D/D =(1—a)g/(because X is constant) and
from (3.10) that =—(l—)g/a.The consumer's intertemporal allocation rule
(3.9) implies then an interest rate
r =p+
Assuming positive product innovation (see the discussion that follows in the text) the
free entry condition (3.6) implies v =a/nand v/v =—g.Substituting these results
together with the profit equation (3.3) into the no—arbitrage condition (3.5) yields (4.3).—17—
engage in R&D. To attain a higher profit rate, however, more resources have to be
employed in manufacturing. The intersection point A describes a long—run equilibrium.
The figure describes a fundamental tradeoff between resource deployment in
innovation and manufacturing. Growth is constrained by resource availability on the
one hand andbymarket incentives on the other. One sees from the figure that a
country innovates faster when it has: (a) a larger resource base (an expansion of L
shifts out the LL line);6 (b) a lower rate of time preference (a reduction of p shifts
down the Schumpeter line NN); (c) a higher degree of monopoly power (a reduction of
a shifts down the Schumpeter line); and (d) a higher intertemporal elasticity of
substitution (a reduction of v shifts down the Schumpeter line). Evidently, the rate of
growth is endogenous. These structural determinants of the rate of innovation can also
be seen directly from the explicit solution
(4.4) g=a +(1_Q)V[(1_ap].
Notethat a positive rate of innovation obtains if and only if L/a > ap/(l—ct).This
restriction applies whenever the effective size of the country is large enough (as
measured by L/a), the degree of monopoly power is large enough (as measured by
1/a), or the rate of time peference is low enough. Otherwise the country does not
innovate.
This result will be qualified later on.
TWhen the proposed parameter restriction does not hold, line NN iii figure 3.1 lies
everywhere above LL in the positive orthand. In this case the intersection point of LL
with the vertical axis represents the equilibrium. At this point the present value of
profits falls short of R&D costs. In the event entrepreneurs have no incentive to
innovate. There also exists a restriction on parameters that prevents innovation from
proceeding at a pace that is so rapid as to make the utility level in (2.3) unbounded.
Since D grows at the rate g(1—a)/a, the functional forms in (2.3) and (3.8) imply— 18—
Welfare
My discussion has concentrated on the determinants of innovation and growth.
A natural question that arises is whether the market allocates resources efficiently
between innovation and manufacturing. There are four sources of potential market
failure.
First, manufacturers price goods above marginal costs.Relative prices of
different brands are not distorted, however, because all suppliers of brands exercise the
same degree of monopoly power. In addition, brands of the differentiated product are
the only goods supplied. For these reasons the departure from marginal cost pricing
does not distort resource allocation (see Lerner [1934]).
• Second, an entrepreneur that contemplates the development of a new product
does not take into account the contribution of his product to consumer surplus.
• Third, the entrepreneur does not take into account the effect of his R&D effort
on profits of competing firms, despite the fact that he depresses the profitability of
competing brands. This feature exemplifies Schumpeter's notion of creative destruction.
• Fourth and last, the benefits to future product developers, that will work with a
larger stock of knowledge capital, are not considered in the decision to invest in R&D.
It so happens that in this model underinvestment in product development as a
result of the disregard for consumer surplus just equals overinvestment in product
development as a result of the disregard for destruction of profits. Thus the allocation
of resources is efficient when product development does not affect the stock of knowledge
p> g(1—v)(1—a)/a for that condition to hold. Substituting (4.4) into this inequality
yields a restriction on the economy's parameters. Observe, however, that the inequality
is satisfied whenever the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is smaller than one; i.e.,
ii?!.—19—
capital(see Grossman and Helpman [1991a, chap. 3]). When R&Dcontributesto the
stockofknowledge capital, however, the equilibrium pace of znnovatzon is too slow.8
5. CAPITAL ACCUMULATION
Up to this point my description of innovation—based growth has disregarded
investment in plant and equipment. I have purposely chosen to present the theory in
this way in order to emphasize its novel elements. In practice, however, investment in
plant and equipment constitutes a large share of GDP (20% or more in many countries),
and the share of investment relates positively to the growth rate of GDP (see Barro
[19911). For these reasons we need to ensure that the theory can encompass investment
in plant and equipment in a suitable way.9
The basic story to be formalized below incorporates the type of capital
accumulation emphasized in the neoclassical growth model. We have seen that in the
neoclassical model technical progress raises the marginal product of capital, thereby
raising the profitability of investment in plant and equipment. In the event capital
deepening, that ceteris paribus depresses the marginal product of capital, can
nevertheless continue indefinitely. The same applies here, except that now technical
8The last point can be seen as follows. It can be shown by means of optimal control or
variational methods that the optimal rate of innovation remains constant over time. In
this case we can compute consumer welfare from (2.3) and (3.8) as
1 ffl(t)(1u)(1_a)/ xl_
Ut=L p—(l—v)(1—a)g/
Maximizingthis expression with respect to g and X subject to the resource constraint
(4.2) yields the optimal rate of innovation. The equilibrium rate of innovation (4.4) is a
fraction (1—ck)v/[a + (l—a)v] of the optimal rate of innovation.
My description follows Grossman and Helpman (1991b, chap. 5). For an alternative
view see Romer (1990a).— 20—
progressis driven by profle seeking entrepreneurs. In other words, the invention of new
brands generates the incentive to install more fixed plant and equipment.
In order to demonstrate the role of conventional capital, consider an economy in
which the differentiated product is an intermediate input. The economy manufactures a
single final homogeneous output Y that can be used for either consumption or
investment in plant and equipment, just like in the neoclassical model. The production
function of Y takes the Cobb—Douglas form:
(5.1) Y = ,fi>o, 1>1—fi-->0,
where A is a constant, D denotes a Dixit—Stiglitz index of differentiated products
(see [3.1]), K represents the stock of plant and equipment, and L represents direct
labor employment in the production of Y. In this specification the production of final
output takes place under constant returns to scale.
In this economy the demand for labor derives from three sources: R&D,
manufacturing of differentiated intermediate inputs and production of the final output.
Therefore labor market clearing requires ag + X + =L.
It is shown in Grossman and Helpman (1991a) that in this type of an economy
with non—depreciating capital the steady state growth rate of output Y equals
(5.2) g,=j-!ljig,
and the rate of investment equals tO
°These calculations assume that (2.3)—(2.4) describe preferences.—21 —
K______ (53) +
Moreover,the equilibrium rate of innovation and the volume of manufacturing of
high—tech differentiated products can be described by means of a figure similar to 3.1.
An analysis of the figure confirms our earlier findings that a country innovates faster in
the long run when its resource base is larger, it is more productive in R&D, it has a
lower rate of time preference, its intertemporal elasticity of substitution is larger, or its
degree of monopoly power is higher (see Grossman and Helpman [1991b, chap. 5]).
Evidently, the rate of investment increases with the rate of output growth while
the latter increases with the rate of innovation. Combined with the results concerning
the determinants of the rate of innovation, these relationships imply, for example, that
countries with low rates of time preference innovate faster, experience faster output
growth, and have a higher rate of investment. Importantly, however, investment is not
aprimary source of growth in these economies. Rather, the primary sources of growth
are a variety of factors (such as the rate of time preference and the degree of monopoly
power) that affect the incentive for industrial research, while the rate of investment
adjusts so as to keep the rate of expansion of conventional capital in line with the
growth rate of output. In terms of causality, the investment rate and the rate of growth
are simultaneously determined by technological progress that affects them in essentially
the same direction, while the pace of technological progress is endcgenously determined
by more primitive factors.— 22—
6.QUALITY LADDERS
In the theory of innovation—based growth that has been described so far
entrepreneurs invest resources in R&D in order to develop new brands of a horizontally
differentiated product. Diversity is valuable per se because it raises productivity of
manufacturing for a given volume of inputs, or household utility for a given volume of
consumption. When coupled with productivity gains in R&D as a result of the
accumulation of knowledge capital, they lead to sustained long—run growth. The growth
rate depends on an economy's resource base, subjective rate of time preference, degree of
monopoly power, and parameters of the production function.
This model has several unattractive features, however. First, new goods are no
better than old. As a result, every brand competes on equal footing with all existing
products. Second, society uses old brands side by side with new ones, without ever
dropping a product.Finally, whereas innovation involves risk taking, the model
employs a deterministic R&D technology. All of these shortcomings notwithstanding,
we have identified a mechanism of economic growth that does not depend on the model's
details: (a) Profit—seeking drives innovation; (b) Innovation contributes to the society's
stock of knowledge in addition to providing the innovator with an appropriable asset;
and (c) An expansion of knowledge capital reduces future innovation costs. This cost
reduction mitigates the decline in the profitability of inventive activity that would have
taken place in its absence. As a result, the profitability of innovation can be sustained,
and with it a positive growth rate. The rate of growth depends on structural features
and on economic policy.
In this section I describe a model of quality ladders in which innovation improves
the quality of a fixed set of goods or reduces their manufacturing costs. New producLs— 23—
driveout old products from the market, and R&D is risky. In this model the rate of
innovation equals the fraction of goods that are improved per unit time. Despite these
marked departures from the model of horizontal product differentiation, I will show that
the same mechanism of economic growth also operates in the new model. Moreover,
both models have a similar reduced form. For this reason a figure similar to 3.1 can be
used to describe its equilibrium. My presentation follows Grossman and Helpman
(1991b, chap. 4), where readers can find the missing details of the arguments.
The economy manufactures a continuum of goods indexed by points on the
interval [0,1]. The utility derived from a good depends on its quality. A consumer
enjoys a unit of good j that was improved m(j) times, j[0,1], as much as ne would
enjoy Am(J) units of the good had it never been improved; A> 1. In this sense
innovation that leads to product improvement raises the quality of a good. One can
verify that all the results that follow also apply when innovation leads to cost reduction,
whereby a product jthatwas improved m(j) times requires A_m(j) times the inputs
per unit output that would have been required if the product had not been improved at
all. I will use the quality improvement interpretation for convenience. Evidently, in.
this case the consumer chooses to buy a quality of good j that extracts the lowest price
per unit quality; i.e., the lowest ratio p(j,m)/Am, where p(j,m) represents the price of
good j that was improved m times.
We continue to represent intertemporal preferences by means of (2.3) and the
flow of utility by means of (3.8), as in the case of horizontal product differentiation.
This time, however, the real consumption index CQ that replaces CD, takes on the
Cobb—Douglas form—24 —
(6.1) CQ =explog X(j)dj],
where X(j) represents the quality equivalent consumption level of good j.If, for
example, good j was improved only once, it is available in two qualities:=1and
=.AThen a consumer who purchases quantity x(j,O) of the lowest quality and
x(j,1) of the improved brand enjoys the quality equivalent consumption level X(j) =
x(j,O)+ )x(j,1). We have argued above, however, that a consumer will choose the
quality that provides the lowest quality adjusted price.In the event X(j) =
wherei(j) represents the consumption level of the brand that provides the lowest
quality adjusted price. We denote by (j) the price of this brand. It follows that the
price index of real consumption CQ equals
1 —.
(6.2) PQ =exp{Jlog [(j)_m(J)Jdj, 0
where iii(j) represents the number of improvements of the brand of good j that
provides the lowest quality adjusted price. This price index can be used to calculate the
optimal intertemporal allocation of real consumption, in analogy with (3.9). Namely,
(6.3)
We turn next to manufacturers and innovators.
An innovator that succeeds in improving a good can charge a price A times
higher than the next to the top quality brand and remain competitive in the market.— 25—
Letthe manufacturing of a brand require one unit of labor per unit output independent
of quality. Then in the ensuing price competition between the suppliers of existing
qualities the manufacturer of the top quality brand captures the entire market by
charging a price that is a shade lower than A times marginal manufacturing costs.
Consequently the top of the line brand provides the lowest quality adjusted price
(6.4) p =Aw.
The same price, which is marked up above marginal costs by the factor A, applies to the
top quality of all goodsjc[O,l).It follows that profits derived from owning the
technology to manufacture a top quality product equal
(6.5) r= [i_.]px,
where X =xrepresents the common output level of the top quality brand of every
good j as well as aggregate output (recall that the measure of goods equals one). Lower
quality products are neither manufactured nor consumed, and the owners of their
technologies derive zero profits. An important thing to note at this stage is the
resemblance of the pricing and profit equations (6.4)—(6.5) to the equivalent equations
(3.2)—(3.3) for the case of horizontal product differentiation (with 1/A replacing o). A
significant difference from the point of view of the theory of the firm, however, is that
now a firm does not maintain monopoly power forever, but rather loses it and shuts
down when a better variety of its good appears on the market. Old products drop out,
they are replaced with new brands.— 26—
Entrepreneurshave to target particular goods for improvement and they face a
risky R&D technology. By employing t(l,j)a workers per unit time in lab I that
targets good jthelab attains a flow density of L(I,j)per unit time of product
improvement (as before, represents a productivity parameter in R&D). An
important feature of our R&D technology is that it is available to everybody and it can
improve the top of the line quality. This means that experience in the improvement of a
particular good does not provide a lab with future advantages in the improvement of
this good. Whatever learning has taken place during the innovation process becomes
public. This assumption introduces a spillover from private R&D to the society's stock
of knowledge capital. And this contribution is not appropriable by the innovator.
It follows from this specification that the firm that owns the technology to
manufacture the top quality brand of good jfacesthe hazard rate £(j)oflosing the
monopoly profit stream, where t(j) equals the aggregate across labs of t(1,j). This
hazard rate is the same for all goods in a symmetric equilibrium, and we denote it
simply by t.Thestock market will value a firm according to its expected present value
of profits, implying a no—arbitrage condition
(6.6)
Compared with (3.5) this condition describes the reality that a firm needs to add a risk
premium Ltoits cost of capital, reflecting the risk of displacement from the market.
An entrepreneur that contemplates investing in product improvement obtains the
prize v if successful. In a time interval of length dt his probability of success is
t(4j)dtif he employs t(4j)a workers per unit time. The difference between his— 27—
expectedreward and costs equals vt(1,j)dt —L.(l,j)wadt,and he chooses t(4j) so as to
maximize this difference.It follows that in equilibrium the value of a firm cannot
exceed wa and it has to equal wa for innovation to take place (compare with 13.6)):
(6.7) v wa,with equality whenever t>0.
It remains to identify the resource constraint. Workers are employed in research
labs and in manufacturing plants. Employment in research labs equals at while
employment in manufacturing plants equals X. Therefore full employment requires
(compare with (4.2])
(6.8) aL+XL.
This completes the description of the model. Our next task is to compare implications
of quality—ladder based growth with expanding—variety based growth.
7. QUALITY LADDERS vs EXPANDING PRODUCT VARIETY
We can characterize the steady—state of the model with quality ladders by means
of two equations, just as we have done for the expanding variety model. One equation
consists of the resource constraint that was derived in the previous section, (6.8), whose
analogy with the resource constraint (4.2) has already been pointed out. The second
equation consists of a no—arbitrage condition, in parallel with (4.3). For the quality— 28—
laddersmodel it takes the formt1
—1
(7.1) (1—A1 )X =p+ $Q)Ii =[1+ (i..'—l)logA]. Aa
This equation is indeed very similar to (4.3).
We may now use a figure similar to 3.1 to describe the resource constraint (6.8)
and the no arbitrage condition (7.1) (where .replacesg on the horizontal axis). From
this figure we can derive the dependence of the long—run rate of innovation on an
economy's parameters. In particular, we find again that the rat.e of innovation is larger
the larger the economy's resource base, the higher its productivity in the lab, the lower
its subjective rate of time preference, and the higher its degree of monopoly power.
Observe, however, that the degree of monopoly power in the quality ladders model
i'msteadystate i remains constant and so does the volume of output X (that also
equals output per product of the highest quality x because the measure of goods equals
one). Take the wage rate to be the numeraire. Then p =Aand -= (1—A)AX(see
[6.4) and [6.5]). Suppose also that i.> 0. Then v =a(see [6.7]) and v/v =0.It
follows that the no—arbitrage condition (6.6) can be written as
(1A)X=r+t
It remains to derive the interest rate by means of (6.1)—(6.3). In (6.1) logX(j) =
logX+th(j)logA,where ñi(j) represents the number of times good j has been
improved (because the top quality product provides the lowest quality adjusted price).
Since all goods are equally targeted, the arrival of improvements follows a Poisson
process with the arrival probability r per unit time. In the event
fjth(j)dj=ttlogA
in a time interval of lengtht.Therefore CQ/CQ =LlogA. A similar argument
establishes that PQIPQ= —LlogA. Substituting these results into (6.3) we obtain
r =p+ (—i)LlogA.
Finally, substituting this interest rate into the no—arbitrage equation (i) above we
obtain (7.1).— 29
resultsfrom limit pricing rather than from monopoly pricing (the price elasticity of
demand equals one). It is measured by A, which determines the extent to which a
manufacturer of the top quality can charge a price above his nearest rival. But the
rival's price is driven to their common marginal manufacturing costs. Therefore A also
describes the markup factor above marginal costs.
From (6.8) and (7.1) we can solve the equilibrium rate of innovation
A I—1L —1
(7.2) =
A+ (ii—1)logA [(1_A )
— Ao
Comparing this equation with (4.4)that describes the rate of innovation for the
expanding variety model —wesee that the terms in brackets are the same in both,
with A1 playing the role of .Ifthe intertemporal elasticity of substitution in
consumption equals one (i.e., v =1),we obtain the remarkable result that there exist
no further differences in these equations (see Grossman and Helpman [1991a]). Since
both A and 1/a describe degrees of monopoly power, it follows that these equations
represent exactly the same economic content. When the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution in consumption differs from one, however, they differ slightly, but do retain
the same economic implications concerning the qualitative effects of various parameters
on the rate of innovation.
The above similarity is not accidental. Rather, the same economic mechanism
sustains long—run growth in both models. Recall that expanding variety based growth
leads to declining profits per brand that are compensated by declining R&D costs. The
latter results from the accumulation of knowledge capital.In the model of quality
ladders innovation adds quality. An innovator that improves a good that was improved
m times in the past derives profits (1_A_l)PX/Am+l per unit quality of his product— 30—
(see[6.5]). It follows that profits per unit quality decline as more innovation takes place
(given a constant price). At the same time innovation costs per unit quality decline at
an equal pace, because innovation costs equal wa (see [6.7])and the price is
proportional to the wage rate. Here, as in the case of expanding product variety, there
exists a spillover of knowledge from current to future innovators. An innovator that
adds the (m+1)th improvement builds on the knowledge that has been accumulated
during the past m improvements. The only difference is that with quality ladders
every good has its own stock of knowledge while with horizontal product differentiation
the same stock of knowledge serves all brands.
The similarity of the models extends to investment in plant and equipment.
Parallel to the analysis of capital accumulation by economies with expanding variety in
section 5, we can develop an analysis of capital accumulation by quality—ladders driven
economies (see Grossman and Helpman [1991b, chap. 5]).
Now consider the relationship between the rate of innovation and the rate of real
output growth. With quality ladders the real consumption index CQ provides a good
measure of real output. Quality improvements increase this index over time. In a short
time interval of length dt innovators improve a proportion tdt of the goods. Since
consumed quantities are constant in steady state, this implies a real consumption
increase dCQ =Ct(logA)dt in this time interval (see [6.11 and footnote 11). Therefore
the rate of growth of real consumption equals Llog.A.
With Dixit—Stiglitz type horizontal product differentiation a market economy
always innovates too slowly. With quality ladders, on the other hand, it may innovate
too slowly or too fast (see Grossman and Helpman [1991a]). This difference affects
policy implications, to which I now turn.—31—
8.POLICY
Whenever economies feature endogenous long—run growth we expect the growth
rate to depend on economic policies. In these circumstances we need to understand how
various measures affect the growth rate. This is the more so for economies with
innovation—based growth of the type I have described, in which free markets may lead
to growth that is either too slow or too fast, and in which growth is only one among
several determinants of welfare.
Now let us consider industrial policies in the simple expanding—variety and
quality—ladders based growth models. For this purpose I use a common representation
by means of figure 8.1, where q stands for the rate of innovation in both models. The
downward slopping line LL represents the the economy's resource constraint. The
upwards slopping line NN describes the no—arbitrage condition. Equilibrium obtains
at the intersection point A. The equations behind these lines consist of the steady state




where in the case of expanding product variety q represents the rate of innovation g,
=oand =1+ (1—)(--1)/a, while in the case of quality ladders q represents the
rate of innovation t,u=1/Aand =1+ (v—1)log.A. In either case i/p represents
the markup factor of prices over marginal costs.—32 —
Firstconsider a subsidy to R&D. This policy has no effect on the resource
constraint. It reduces, however, the cost of innovation and thereby the value of a firm.
As a result it reduces the price earning ratio for a given volume of manufacturing.
Therefore the volume of manufacturing has to decline in order to eliminate arbitrage
opportunities. In terms of figure 8.1 the provision of an R&D subsidy shifts down NN to
the broken line, and the equilibrium point to B. It follows that an R&D subsidy raises
the rates of innovation and growth. At the same time it contracts the manufacturing
sector. The contraction of manufacturing represents the cost of faster innovation.
Is this a good policy? The answer depends on whether the initial rate of
innovation was too low or too high. I have argued that expanding product variety leads
to an outcome with insufficient innovation. Then a small R&D subsidy that brings
about a resource reallocation from manufacturing to labs raises welfare. 12
Contraryto expanding product variety, quality ladders can lead to either
insufficient or excessive innovation. In the former case an R&D subsidy can be useful.
In the latter case, however, an R&D subsidy speeds up innovation but hurts welfare. In
the event a tax on innovation, that removes the overincentives on creative destruction,
raises welfare.
An alternative industrial policy provides direct support to high—tech
manufacturing in the form of an output subsidy. This policy does not affect the resource
constraint. It also has no effect on the no—arbitrage condition. Therefore it does not
change the rate of innovation and growth nor the volume of output (see Grossman and
Helpman [1991aJ).
t2The optimal rate of subsidy can be calculated by means of the welfare measure
developed in footnote 8 (see also Grossman and Helpman [1991a1).Additional
complications arise when the differentiated products are capital goods; see Barro and
Sala i Martin (1990).— 33—
Theineffectiveness of this policy results from the simple structure of these
economies: The existence of a single input and no employment outside the high—tech
sector. I now show that if we extend the model to include an additional sector that
manufactures traditional goods with constant returns to scale, then an output subsidy to
high—tech manufacturing accelerates innovation and increases the output level of
high—tech products. The expansion of the high—tech sector comes at the expense of the
traditional sector, which contracts.
Suppose that in addition to the high—tech sector the economy manufactures a
traditional good Z with a unit of labor per unit output. Perfect competition prevails in
the supply of Z. Consumers allocate a fraction a of their spending to high—tech
products and a fraction 1—a to traditional goods. We replace the real consumption
index CD with in the case of horizontal product differentiation and C with
CC° in the case of quality ladders. Under these circumstances the no—arbitrage
condition (8.2) remains valid, except for the fact that now =1+ a(1—)(t—1)/c for
the expanding variety model and=1+ a(t.'—1)logA for the model with quality
ladders.
Three activities absorb resources: R&D, manufacturing of high—tech goods, and
manufacturing of traditional goods. The resource constraint becomes aq + X + Z =
whereZ represents output of traditional goods. Consumer preferences imply that
relative spending on high—tech goods equals pX/pZ= cr/(1—a)(because in
equilibrium pX = J =D,Q,and C =Z).Commodities are priced according to
p =w/zand p =w.Therefore in equilibrium the output level of traditional goods is
proportional to the output level of high—tech goods; Z =Xpc/(1—a).It follows that
the resource constraint can be represented by—34—
(8.3) aq + [i + =L.
Now (8.2) and (8.3) can be used to represent equilibrium of both models with the aid of
figure 8.2, which is similar to 8.1 except for the fact that the slopes of lines LL and NN
depend on the share of spending on high—tech products. The simpler model represented
in figure 8.1 is a special case with =1.
In order to see how the equilibrium rate of innovation depends on the
composition of consumer spending, consider the case in which the elasticity of
intertemporal substitution in consumption does not exceed one, i.e.,ii￿1. In this case
n incicase in the expenditure share on high—tech products rotates the resource
constraint line LL in a clockwise direction around its intersection with the horizontal
axis, and the Schumpeter line NN in a clockwise direction around its intersection with
the vertical axis. The movement of each line raises the rate of innovation. We therefore
conclude that economies with larger spending shares on high—tech products innovate
faster.
The existence of a traditional good does not alter the long—run impact of an R&D
subsidy. As before an R&D subsidy does not affect the resource constraint but shifts
down the Schumpeter line. Consequently it speeds up innovation and growth and
reduces the volume of high—tech products. Since this policy does not affect relative
manufacturing volumes X/Z, the traditional sector contracts. It follows that an R&D
subsidy induces a resource reallocation from both manufacturing sectors towards
research labs.
And what about an output subsidy to high—tech producers? As before this policy
does not affect the no—arbitrage condition. It changes, however, the resource constraint.
Recall that aq + X + Z =L,pX/pZ =a/(1—c),and p =w.But with the output— 35—
subsidyin place, p =w/p(l+),where is the subsidy rate.Therefore the
subsidy inclusive resource constraint becomes
(8.4) aq + {i + ,(1+Øx)JX= L.
What this equation shows is that, given the output volume X, an increase in the
subsidy reduces the relative price of high—tech products to consumers and thereby
demand for traditional products.Consequently it reduces aggregate manufacturing
employment. Evidently, an increase in the subsidy rotates clockwise line LL around its
intersection point with the horizontal axis, as indicated by the broken line in figure 8.2.
The equilibrium point shifts from A to B. We see that this time an output subsidy to
high—tech products speeds up innovation and expands manufacturing of high—tech
goods. The expansion of the high—tech sector comes at the expense of the traditional
sector, which contracts.
Even this result is not robust, however. There exist reasonable economic
structures in which a subsidy to high—tech manufacturing will actually reduce the rates
of innovation and growth. To see how, suppose that in addition to labor an economy
employs human capital in all three activities —manufacturingof high—tech goods,
manufacturing of traditional goods, and R&D —withconstant input—output ratios.
R&D uses the highest ratio of human capital to labor while traditional manufacturing
uses the lowest ratio. Finally, the supply of human capital is constant. Under these
circumstances an expansion of high—tech manufacturing leads to a contraction of both,
the manufacturing of traditional goods and R&D, because the factor intensity of
high—tech manufacturing is intermediate between R&D and traditional manufacturing.— 36—
Inthe event an output subsidy to high—tech products leads to an expansion of high—tech
production but to a slowdown of tnnovation and a contraction of the traditional sector
(see Grossman and Helpman [1991b, chap. 10]). Thus, this modeling approach allows us
to investigate whether policies that would appear to promote growth actually do so.
The two—factor two—sector model that I outlined above can also be used to shed
new light on the relationship between an economy's resource base and its rate of
innovation and growth (see Grossman and Helpman [1991a]).Recall that in the
one—factor one—sector economy the rates of innovation and growth are higher the larger
the economy's resource base. The same applies to the two—sector one—factor economy.
In the presence of two factors, however, a larger resource base does not guarantee faster
innovation. Given that the human capital to labor ratio is highest in R&D and lowest
in traditional manufacturing, economies with higher stocks of human capital innovate
faster. If in addition the elasticities of substitution in manufacturing exceed one, then
economies with more labor also innovate faster. But if instead the elasticities of
substitution are low in all three activities, economies with more labor innovate slower
(see Grossman and Helpman [1991b, chap. 5]).13Thegeneral point that emerges from
this discussion is that inputs that are used intensively in R&D are conducive to
innovation and growth while inputs that are used intensively in the manufacturing of
traditional goods may discourage innovation and growth.
'3Romer (1990b) presents a two-factor one—sector example in which an expansion of
labor, in which manufacturing is relatively intensive, reduces the rate of innovation and
growth.— 37—
9.FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS
My description of the macroeconomic theory of endogenous growth has been
incomplete;it did not cover all existing approaches nor did it deal with all the issues
that have been treated in the literature. Admittedly, my choices exhibit a large dose of
subjectivity. This type of bias is, however, unavoidable, and I did not intend to survey
the literature. I focused my presentation on one important class of mechanisms that
sustain long—run growth, a small number of models that employ them, and a limited
number of issues that demonstrate the usefulness of viewing economic growth in this
particular way. In these closing comments I do not wish to take a position on the
important issue of which model is best. As a rule I believe in pluralism. We gain much
insight by dealing with economic problems from a variety of perspectives. This is the
more so for a major problem of the type considered in this paper. For this reason I limit
the remaining remarks to a number of issues that were not treated so far, but which I
feel deserve special mention.
Real Interest and Growth Rates
The models that we discussed have the unfortunate implication that, given taste
parameters, the real rate of interest increases with the growth rate, while the evidence
does not support this relationship (see Barro and Sala i Martin [1990]). Does this fact
destroy the usefulness of these models? I think it does not. The models were designed
to study supply—side mechanisms of economic growth that build on the accumulation of
physical capital, the accumulation of knowledge capital, and innovation. For this reason
they treat consumption in a simple way.Elaborations that allow for different
determinants of consumption can break this link without diminishing the role of the— 38—
supply—sidemechanisms in the growth process. One way to proceed would be to replace
the time separable preference structure with a non—separable form of the type studied
by Weil (1989) and Epstein and Zin (1990).
An alternative route to the same end would be to use an overlapping generations
economy populated by consumers with finite lifetimes. The latter approach has been
explored by a number of authors.Using Yaari—I3lanchard type consumers and a
neoclassical technology that exhibits learning—by—doing in capital accumulation,
Alogoskoufis and van der Ploeg (1990) constructed a model in which the rate of
long—run growth depends on fiscal variables while the real interest does not. It follows
that countries that pursue different fiscal policies may experience different long—run
growth rates and nevertheless share the same real interest rate. They show that, other
things equal, countries that maintain a higher public debt to output ratio grow slower,
because consumers consider government debt to be net wealth and therefore save less in
high public debt countries. In the event real interest rates and growth rates are not
positively correlated.
Fluctuations
Innovation—based growth can proceed smoothly or in bursts. We have seen two
models in which it proceeds smoothly. Of particular interest on this issue is the model
of quality ladders. There every good is improved after an irregular interval of time has
elapsed. Because there exists a large number of such goods, however, the proportion of
goods improved in a given time interval remains constant in the steady state. For this
reason the rate of growth of the macro—economy remains constant as well (out of steady
state this rate changes smoothly).Naturally, the smooth pace of progress of the
macro—economy masks substantial turmoil at the industry level.— 39—
Onemay argue that there exist important innovations that are not limited to a
particular product, but rather have broad applications, such as general purpose
technologies discussed by Bresnahan and Trajtenberg (1990).Inthe event a successful
innovation leads to a step increase in real output. If such drastic innovations occur
infrequently and at irregular intervals of time, the economy exhibits irregular bursts of
growth. Then the growth rate exhibits substantial variability even when its mean
remains constant.
A model of this nature was analyzed by Aghion and Howitt (1990). In their
model output experiences positive shocks at irregular intervals of time and the logarithm
of output follows a random walk.
Unemployment
Innovation—based growth entails a constant reallocation of labor. In the presence
of horizontal product differentiation manufacturers of new brands employ labor that has
been released by contracting old product lines.In the presence of quality ladders
manufacturers of new products employ labor that has been released by old product lines
that shut down, as superior new goods replace lower quality old products. My
presentation assumed full employment, implying that these labor shifts take place
instantly and without friction. This assumption is obviously extreme, and one expects
some frictional unemployment in a reallocation process of this magnitude. This is the
more so when labor is heterogeneous and the skill composition of new hires does not
necessarily match the skill composition of displaced workers.In short,
innovation—driven growth may not be as painless as assumed in our models. In the
event one wonders whether growth that generates new jobs on the one hand and
destroys jobs on the other raises or reduces the rate of unemployment.— 40—
Thisquestion has been addressed by Aghion and Howitt (1991). The answer
proves to be involved, In particular, the effect of faster innovation and growth on the
rate of unemployment depends on the factors that speed up innovation.
International Trade
Economic growth of countries depends on a variety of structural features and
government policies. Since so far my discussion was confined to isolated economies, the
structural features and policies that I considered were also confined to isolated
economies. Economies are, however, linked with each other by means of international
trade, capital flows, imitation of cultural traits, and the transfer of ideas and scientific
discoveries. Does this openness affect the growth opportunities of nations? And are the
growth processes of open economies interdependent? The answers to both questions are
in the affirmative. A recent book—length treatment of innovation and growth in open
economies has been provided by Grossman and Helpman (1991b), and I could not
possibly deal with this subject in a satisfactory way in the framework of this paper that
has been confined to macroeconomic theory.Let me therefore provide only brief
comments on some open—economy issues that have been investigated.
The integration of a nation into a world trading system unleashes powerful forces
that speed up growth. But it also unleashes forces that are harmful to growth. The
former dominate, however, when countries do not differ too much in terms of resource
composition, and knowledge flows freely across national borders. The extent to which
the accumulation of knowledge capital is country specific or international in scope also
plays an important role in the determination of trade patters and growth differentials
across countries. Internationalization of knowledge leads to long—run trade patters and
GDP growth rates that are governed by traditional forces, such as differences in factor—41 —
composition.In the event initial differences in comparative advantage that result from
historical experiences do not affect long—term outcomes. When knowledge accumulation
is localized, however, history can extract powerful effects on the evolution of trade
patters and growth rates.Under these circumstances small initial differences in
knowledge capital can translate into large long—run differences in sectoral structures,
trade patterns and growth rates.
In open economies trade policies affect innovation and growth. Not only do they
influence the policy active country but also its trade partners. Other policy measures,
such as R&D or output subsidies, spread their influence across national borders and
alter the rates of innovation and growth of trade partners.
Research and development need not be directed to the invention of new goods or
production processes. Less developed countries invest substantial resources in learning
to operate technologies that were originally developed in advanced economies. This
process of imitation by the South affects the incentive to innovate in the North, and vice
versa. The rate of innovation is jointly determined with the rate of imitation by more
fundamental ingredients, and this interdependence can be quite involved.
I have outlined a new approach to economic growth. The emerging theory
complements Solow's contribution in explaining technical progress. It provides a richer
structure with realistic new attributes, and it is capable of dealing with a variety of new
issues. Although there exists a fair number of new empirical studies, some supporting
Solow and others supporting the new theory, it is fair to say that at this stage the data
do not distinguish sharply enough between the alternatives. This has partly to do with
the fact that the neoclassical theory and the new one are complements rather than
substitutes, and partly because the existing tests are not powerful enough. We will
undoubtedly see much more work on this subject in the coming years.—42 —
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